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At any rate, the Kippen case clearly illustrates the extent to
which the first department has dismissed causes for general delay
under the old version of 3216, and makes one curious as to how
they will react to the new amendment's strict limitations upon their
discretion.
Collateral Estoppel: Defense allowed despite claim that issue
was not decided by the jury.
In Bronzville Palmer, Limited v. State,97 the Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff's action in the Court of Claims was
barred by a previous judgment against the plaintiff in the supreme
court. In the supreme court, the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought
recovery for trespass against two contractors engaged by the
state. While it was not disputed that the exoneration of the
servant would inure to the benefit of the master, the plaintiff urged
that the issue of the contractors' trespass was not properly presented
to the jury. Plaintiff contended that the jury was erroneously
charged that if it found that the state was to blame for directing
the trespass, the verdict could be for the contractors. The majority
of the Court of Appeals found that this argument of erroneous
charge was not substantiated by the trial record and, therefore,
allowed the state's defense.98
The dissent felt that the result of the earlier adjudication was
the finding that the state had directed the contractors to go onto
plaintiff's land.9 9 Thus, the issue of whether a trespass had been
committed by the contractors had been excluded from the jury's
determination. Therefore, the dissent concluded that collateral
estoppel should not bar the suit.
It must be noted that the majority and the dissent differed
only on the question of whether, in fact, the jury had decided
some issue other than the physical trespass of the contractors.
Both agreed that if that issue had not actually been decided,
the supreme court judgment would not have barred the Court
of Claims action. It is well settled that a prior judgment is
final only as to issues that are actually decided. 00
Although this case does not alter any existing principles of
the law of judgments, it has a practical significance which must
be noted by the litigator. Where the issues actually decided by
the jury are unclear, whether because of an improper charge or
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otherwise, the determination must be appealed and the case
clarified lest a subsequent suit be precluded by the defense of
collateral estoppel.
ARTICLE 52-

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5231 and Personal Property Law Section 49-b: Simultaneous deductions under support order and income execution
allowed.
Defendant-employer in Costa v. Chevrolet-Tonawanda, Division of General Motors Corp.,10 ' was directed by an order pursuant
to Personal Property Law Section 49-b to deduct a certain sum
from an employee's salary to be allocated for the support of the
employee's wife. Thereafter, defendant was served with an income
execution against the employee's salary. The City Court of
Buffalo, seeming to rely heavily on the facts of the case, ruled
that the priority provision of section 49-b did not preclude a
simultaneous income execution deduction under CPLR 5231, 1so
02
long as the support money for the wife remained untouched.
The court pointed out that section 49-b was for an obligation,
both legal and moral, arising out of the marital relationship 03
Since the defendant would be liable for the support obligation anyway, and since the legislature limited income execution to ten
percent of the debtor's income to keep the remainder available
for support of the family, concurrent imposition of both the income
execution and the support order was found by the court to be
consistent.0 4
However, in Matter of Beahm,10 5 a section 49-b order for
support was made subsequent to an outstanding CPLR 5231 income
execution. The Family Court, Richmond County, held that the
support order suspended the CPLR 5231 income execution until
reinstated by another court. 06
The Costa and Beahm decisions, though apparently at odds,
are capable of resolution. In Beahm, the family court was merely
deferring final determination as to the simultaneous deductions to
the court from whence the income execution issued.
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